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NOTES
forced to choose between the two. Either the privilege or the
duty must yield, and it is preferable in balancing conflicting
values to make inroads into the privilege than to abrogate the
duty. It is submitted that the instant decision is not only justi-
fied, but necessitated by the high station of the attorney and his
relationship to the courts. If attorneys are to retain the confi-
dence of the public, they must conduct their affairs in a manner
which would justify such confidence, or, failing to do so, be
removed from the profession.
John Schwab II
CRIMINAL LAW - INSANITY - BURDEN OF PROOF
Defendant was charged with murder. As a defense defend-
ant pleaded insanity at the time of the commission of the crime.'
During the voir dire examination of prospective jurors, the trial
judge sustained an objection by the state to a statement made
by defense counsel concerning the degree of proof required
where insanity is urged as a defense. In so doing, the judge
stated: "[M]y idea is that the defense is required to prove in-
sanity not only by a preponderance of evidence but beyond a
reasonable doubt of insanity, not reasonable doubt of sanity."2
(Emphasis added.) At the time this statement was made
five jurors had been accepted, and four of the five then being
examined eventually served. On appeal to the Louisiana Su-
preme Court, held, reversed. Where insanity is urged as a de-
fense to a criminal charge the defendant need only prove his
insanity by a preponderance of the evidence.3 State v. Stewart,
117 So.2d 583 (La. 1960).
1. Defendant also pleaded present insanity, but the court did not consider this
issue.
2. State v. Stewart, 117 So.2d 583, 584 (La. 1960).
3. In the instant case the Supreme Court stated that an erroneous statement
of law made by the trial judge which is prejudicial vitiates the verdict and en-
titles the accused to a new trial even though the judge subsequently charges the
correct law. State v. Langford, 133 La. 120, 62 So. 597 (1913) was cited by the
court. In addition, the court stated that an erroneous instruction cannot be cured
by another instruction unless the erroneous instruction is expressly admitted to
be such and formally withdrawn from the jury by the trial judge, citing State v.
Jones, 36 La. Ann. 204 (1884). It is interesting to note that in the instant case
the judge instructed the jury erroneously in the charge as well as on the voir dire.
The charge given was: "After you have weighed and given credit to the evidence
on both sides of the question if you still entertain a reasonable doubt that this
defendant is insane the defendant should be held by you to be sane." Record,
vol. 7, p. 1989. A bill of exception was taken to parts of the instruction, but
the bill did not include the above language. It would seem that had the language
been included, the Supreme Court could have rested its decision on this more
direct ground rather than on statements made by the judge on voir dire.
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In American jurisdictions, three rules have been applied con-
cerning the burden of proof as to the defense of insanity at the
time of the crime, to wit: (1) the defendant must prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that he was insane ;4 (2) the defendant must
satisfy the jury of insanity by a preponderance of the whole evi-
dence in the case ;5 (3) if, upon the whole evidence, there be
reasonable doubt that the defendant was sane, he should be
acquitted." The rule which requires the defendant to prove his
insanity beyond a reasonable doubt was first enunciated in 1812
on the trial of Bellingham. 7 Courts which applied this rule did
so on the theory that since the state is required to negative the
presumption of innocence beyond a reasonable doubt, the de-
fendant should be required to negative the presumption of sanity
beyond a reasonable doubt . The English courts rejected this
rule and accepted the preponderance of the evidence rule at least
as early as 1843 in M'Naghten's case.9 The beyond a reasonable
doubt rule was applied in some of the earlier cases in this
country, but was later rejected. 10 The second rule, which re-
quires the defendant to prove his defense of insanity by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, is applied by twenty-two states,"
4. State v. Garver, 190 Ore. 291, 225 P.2d 771 (1950). This case is based on
a statute which has since been amended. Thus Oregon, the last proponent of this
rule, has rejected it. See note 9 infra.
5. State v. Chinn, 229 La. 984, 87 So.2d 315 (1956).
6. Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895).
7. This case is unreported. Reference to it was made in 1 COLLINSON, A
TREATISE OF THE LAW CONCERNING IDIOTS, LUNATICICS (sic) AND OTHER PER-
SONS NON COMPOTES (sic) MENSIS 636 (1812), which was cited in HALL, PRIN-
CIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 480 (1947). This case was also referred to in State v.
Lyons, 113 La. 959, 37 So. 890 (1904).
8. State v. Spencer, 21 N.J.L. 196 (1846).
9. 10 Clark & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). See State v. Lyons, 113 La.
959, 37 So. 890 (1904), in which the court stated that the M'Naghten case is
generally accepted as the foundation case of the preponderance of the evidence
rule, although this rule may have been applied before this decision.
10. The rule was applied early in the United States in State v. Spencer, 21
N.J.L. 196 (1846), but the New Jersey court in Graves v. State, 46 N.J.L. 203
(1883) applied the preponderance of the evidence rule. The disposal of this rule
by the New Jersey court, one of the first jurisdictions to employ it, is typical of the
treatment which the rule has received in American jurisdictions. Oregon applied
this rule until 1957, when the statute requiring the rule was amended. ORE. REV.
STAT. § 136.390 (1953): "Insanity at time of commision of act as a defense.
When the commission of the act charged as a crime is proved and the defense
sought to be established is the insanity of the defendant, the same must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt." Amended in 1957 to read: "Insanity at time of com-
mission of act as a defense. When the commission of the act charged as a crime is
proved and the defense sought to be established is the insanity of the defendant,
the same must be proved by the preponderance of the evidence."
11. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.03, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). The
number of states following this rule is listed as being twenty-one. However, since
this draft was published Oregon amended its statute requiring proof of insanity
beyond a reasonable doubt. Oregon now requires the defendant to prove insanity
by a preponderance of the evidence. Hence, twenty-two states follow this rule.
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including Louisiana. An alternative statement of the rule, often
used by the courts, is that the defendant must prove insanity to
the satisfaction of the jury, for a preponderance of the evidence
is recognized as that of a character to satisfy the mind, although
it be not free from reasonable doubt.12 The third rule, which
requires acquittal when the defendant raises a reasonable doubt
as to his sanity, is applied in twenty-one states, the federal
courts, and the District of Columbia. 13 The rationale of this
rule is that sanity is an essential element of the crime. Conse-
quently, as all of the elements of the crime must be proven be-
yond a reasonable doubt, an acquittal must result whenever a
reasonable doubt as to sanity is raised. 14
In State v. De Rance,'5 decided in 1882, the Louisiana Su-
preme Court veered from its prior use of the preponderance of
the evidence rule16 and applied the early English rule requiring
the defendant to prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt.
However, in 1897, the Supreme Court in State v. Scott" reverted
to the preponderance of evidence rule. In the instant case the
trial judge relied upon the De Rance case. In reversing the trial
judge the Supreme Court referred to the Scott case and stated
that the burden is on the defendant to show by clear and con-
vincing proof the insanity he urges as a defense. Following this
position, the presumption of sanity is to be taken into considera-
tion, along with all the testimony before the jury, whether pro-
duced by the accused or by the state. If on consideration of the
whole case the jury is satisfied that the defendant was not sane
when the act charged was committed, then he is to be acquitted.
This decision, in following the preponderance of the evidence
rule, maintains the consistency in the jurisprudence of the state
since the Scott decision.
The rule applied by the Louisiana Supreme Court is both
analytically and practically sound. The rule that the defendant
must prove his insanity beyond a reasonable doubt is unsatisfac-
tory in that it places on the defendant a burden of proving some-
thing which is not usually susceptible of such conclusive proof,
especially where the insanity is not continuing. On the other
extreme, a rule that acquittal is required where the defendant
12. State v. Scott, 49 La. Ann. 253, 21 So. 271 (1897).
13. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.03, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
14. Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895).
15. 34 La. Ann. 186 (1882).
16. State v. Coleman, 27 La. Ann. 691 (1875) ; State v. Burns, 25 La. Ann.
302 (1873).
17. 49 La. Ann. 253, 21 So. 271 (1897).
1960]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
creates a reasonable doubt as to his mental capacity is also un-
satisfactory. This rule treats sanity as a part of the criminal
intent, or mens rea, and thus as a necessary element of the
crime. However, mental capacity and criminal intent, as a gen-
eral rule, are not one and the same thing.'8 Criminal intent
involves the question of whether the defendant actively desired
(specific intent) or could be expected to know (general intent)
that certain consequences would result from his act, whereas
the test of insanity as applied in Louisiana and other jurisdic-
tions essentially deals with whether the defendant appreciated
the wrongness of his conduct. The existence of insanity should
only be considered as an affirmative defense for urging the lack
of criminal responsibility when both the facts relative to the
commission of the proscribed conduct and the requisite intent
element have been established. 19 In addition, as a practical mat-
ter the second rule is preferable to the third because the latter
disregards the presumption of sanity and places the burden on
the state to establish the defendant's sanity after only "some evi-
dence" 20 of insanity has been presented by the defense. 21 In
effect the state is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the mental condition of the defendant was in fact that
which society initially presumed it to be. Also, the defendant
is certainly in a better position to prove his insanity than is the
state to prove his sanity.
Bernard E. Boudreaux, Jr.
CRIMINAL LAW - THE FELONY MANSLAUGHTER DOCTRINE
IN LOUISIANA
Defendant attempted to kill a bartender with a knife and the
bartender fired a pistol in self-defense. The bullet from the
pistol struck and killed a customer sitting at the bar. Defendant
18. It would seem that the only instance in which insanity should be treated
as an element of the crime is, as in voluntary intoxication, where its presence
precludes the possibility of any intent. Generally, voluntary intoxication is no
defense, but it may preclude the presence of a specific intent or knowledge, which
is an element of a crime, when the defendant is so intoxicated that he could not
possibly desire or know that certain consequences will result from his act.
Similarly, if the defendant is so insane that he cannot desire or know that certain
consequences will result from his act, then he lacks criminal intent. However, this
insanity must be an extreme case, possibly bordering on the old wild beast classi-
fication. Practically, such a person will not be brought to trial, and this excep-
tion is more in the realm of theoretical speculation than in reality.
19. State v. Surrency, 148 La. 983, 88 So. 240 (1921).
20. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2491(2) (3d ed. 1940).
21. Id. §§ 2485-2491, 2497.
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